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Abstract—As a means of decentralized machine learning, fed-
erated learning (FL) has recently drawn considerable attentions.
One of the prominent advantages of FL is its capability of
preventing clients’ data from being directly exposed to external
adversaries. Nevertheless, via a viewpoint of information theory,
it is still possible for an attacker to steal private information from
eavesdropping upon the shared models uploaded by FL clients.
This is because client’s local data are used for training of the
shared models, which implicitly carry client’s private informa-
tion. In order to address this problem, we develop a novel privacy
preserving FL framework based on the concept of differential
privacy (DP). To be specific, we first borrow the concept of local
DP and introduce a client-level DP (CDP) by adding artificial
noises to the shared models before uploading them to servers.
Then, we prove that our proposed CDP algorithm can satisfy
the DP guarantee with adjustable privacy protection levels by
varying the variances of the artificial noises. More importantly,
we derive a theoretical convergence upper-bound of the CDP
algorithm. Our derived upper-bound reveals that there exists an
optimal number of communication rounds to achieve the best
convergence performance in terms of loss function values for
a given privacy protection level. Furthermore, to obtain this
optimal number of communication rounds, which cannot be
derived in a closed-form expression, we propose a communication
rounds discounting (CRD) method. Compared with the heuristic
searching method, our proposed CRD can achieve a much better
trade-off between the computational complexity of searching
for the optimal number and the convergence performance.
Extensive experiments indicate that our CDP algorithm with
an optimization on the number of communication rounds using
the proposed CRD can effectively improve both the FL training
efficiency and FL model quality for a given privacy protection
level.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the dramatic development of the internet-of-things
(IoT), data from intelligent devices is exploding at unprece-
dented scales [1], [2]. Conventional machine learning (ML)
is often no longer capable of efficiently processing data in a
centralized manner. To tackle this challenge, several distributed
ML architectures, e.g., federated learning (FL), have been pro-
posed with different approaches of aggregating models [3]–[8].
In FL, all clients with the same data structure collaboratively
learn a shared model with the help of a server, i.e., training
the model at clients and aggregating model parameters at
the server. Owing to the local training, FL does not require
clients to upload their private data, thereby effectively reducing
transmission overhead as well as preserving clients’ privacy.
As such, FL is applicable to a variety of scenarios where data
are either sensitive or expensive to transmit to the server, e.g.,
health-care records, private images, and personally identifiable
information, etc. [9]–[11].
Although FL can preserve private data from being exposed
to the public, hidden adversaries may attack the learning model
by eavesdropping and analyzing the shared parameters, e.g.,
via a reconstruction attack and inference attack [12]–[14].
For example, a malicious classifier may reveal the features
of clients’ data and reconstruct data points from a given
FL model. Some common attack strategies can be found
in recent studies. The work in [15] recovered the private
data based on the observation that the gradient of weights is
proportional to that of the bias, and their ratio approximates to
the training input. The work in [16] considered collaborative
learning and proposed a generative adversarial network (GAN)
based reconstruction attack. Furthermore, this reconstruction
attack utilized the shared model as the discriminator to train
a GAN [17] model that generates prototypical samples of the
training data. In [12], Melis et al. demonstrated that the shared
models in FL leak unintended information from participants’
training data, and they developed passive and active inference
attacks to exploit this leakage. The work in [13] proposed a
framework incorporating GAN with a multi-task discriminator
to explore user-level privacy, which simultaneously discrimi-
nates category, reality, and client identity of input samples. The
work in [18] showed that it is possible to obtain the private
training data from the publicly shared gradients, namely, deep
leakage from gradient, which was empirically validated on
both computer vision and natural language processing tasks.
Therefore, for the purpose of preserving data contributors’
privacy, it is crucial to design an effective algorithm to mitigate
the privacy concerns for data sharing without damaging the
quality of trained FL models. In this paper, in order to prevent
information leakage from the shared model parameters and
improve the training efficiency, we develop a novel privacy-
preserving FL framework. We first borrow the concept of
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local differential privacy (LDP), and introduce a client-level
differential privacy (CDP) algorithm. Then, we prove that the
CDP satisfies the requirement of DP under a certain privacy
level by properly adapting their variances of the Gaussian
mechanism. We also develop a theoretical convergence bound
of the CDP algorithm, which reveals that there exists an opti-
mal number of communication rounds in terms of convergence
performance for a given privacy level. Furthermore, we design
an online optimization method, termed communication rounds
discounting (CRD), which can obtain a better tradeoff between
complexity and convergence performance compared with the
offline heuristic searching method. Evaluations demonstrate
that our theoretical results are consistent with simulations.
Extensive experiments validate that our discounting method
in CDP can achieve an equivalent performance compared with
offline searching in terms of loss function values with a much
lower complexity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
related work is introduced in Section II, and the threat model
and backgrounds on DP and FL are explained in Section III.
Then, we show the details of the proposed CDP algorithm and
its convergence bound are presented in Section IV, and present
the noise recalculation and CRD methods in Section V. The
analytical and experimental results are shown in Section VI.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present related work on ML with DP and
privacy-preserving FL.
A. Machine Learning with Differential Privacy
Privacy-preserving ML has attracted intensive attentions
over the last decade, as the emergence of centralized search-
able data repositories and open data applications may lead to
the leakage of private information [19]. The work in [20] first
proposed the concept of deep learning with differential privacy
(DP), providing an evaluation criterion for privacy guarantees.
The work in [21] designed a functional mechanism to perturb
the objective function of the neural network in the training
process to achieve a certain DP level. However, this work lacks
a tight analysis on the cumulative privacy loss because the
privacy budget is uniformly distributed over training epochs
and the gaps become large when the training epochs increase.
The work in [22] improved the DP based stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) algorithms by carefully allocating of privacy
budget at each training iteration. In [22], the privacy budget
and step size for each iteration are dynamically determined
at runtime based on the quality of the noisy statistics (e.g.,
gradient) obtained for the current training iteration.
Recently, ML with distributed frameworks becomes more
and more popular, due to the ever-increasing capability of
IoT devices. Therefore, privacy issues are more critical in
distributed ML. The work in [23] introduced the notion of
DP and proposed a distributed online learning algorithm to
improve the learning performance for a given privacy level.
The work in [24] analyzed the privacy loss in a DP-based dis-
tributed ML framework, and provided the explicit convergence
performance. The work in [25] presented a theoretical analysis
of DP-based SGD algorithms, and provided an approach for
analyzing the quality of ML models related to the privacy level
and the size of the datasets.
B. Privacy Preserving in Federated Learning
A formal treatment of privacy risks in FL calls for a holistic
and interdisciplinary approach [26], [27]. The work in [28]
proposed a privacy-preserving FL framework to maintain a
given privacy level with a low performance loss when there
are a sufficiently large number of participating clients. The
work in [29] presented a novel approach to combining DP with
secure multiparty computation, thereby reducing the growth
of noise injection when the number of participants increases
without sacrificing privacy. The work in [30] proposed a novel
sketch-based FL framework to obtain provable DP benefits
for clients, which can compress the transmitted messages via
sketches to a high communication efficiency.
Table I
SUMMARY OF MAIN NOTATION
M A randomized mechanism for DP
D,D′ Adjacent databases
, δ The parameters related to DP
Ci The i-th client
Di The dataset held by the owner Ci
Di,m The m-th sample in Di
D The dataset held by all the clients
| · | The cardinality of a set
U Total number of all users
K The number of chosen clients (1 ≤ K ≤ U )
t The index of the t-th communication round
T The number of communication rounds
w The vector of model parameters
F (w) Global loss function
Fi(w) Local loss function from the i-th client
wti Local training parameters of the i-th client
w˜ti Local training parameters after adding noises
w0 Initial parameters of the global model
wt Global parameters generated from local
parameters at the t-th communication round
w∗ The optimal parameters that minimize F (w)
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the threat model and backgrounds
on DP and FL.
A. Threat Model and DP Guarantee
The inference attack [12], [13] and reconstruction at-
tack [14] aim to infer private features or reconstruct the
training data by a learning model, respectively. In this paper,
we assume that the server is honest-but-curious, which may
recover the training datasets or infer the private features based
on the local uploaded parameters. Concretely, this curious
server may train a GAN framework, e.g., multi-task GAN-
AI [13], which simultaneously discriminates category, reality,
and client identity of input samples. The novel discrimination
on client identity enables the generator to recover users’
private data. This curious server may also be interested in
learning whether a given sample belongs to the training
datasets, which can be inferred by utilizing the difference
between model outputs from training and non-training this
sample, respectively [31]. For example, when conducting a
clinical experiment, a person may not want the observer to
know whether he is involved in the experiment (a client
may contain several individuals’ records). This is due to
the fact that the observer can link the test results to the
appearance/disappearance of a certain person and inflict harm
to that person.
DP mechanism with parameters  and δ provides a strong
criterion for the privacy preservation of distributed data pro-
cessing systems. Here,  > 0 is the distinguishable bound
of all outputs on neighboring datasets D,D′ in a database,
and δ represents the probability of the event that the ratio of
the probabilities for two adjacent datasets D,D′ cannot be
bounded by e after adding a privacy-preserving mechanism.
With an arbitrarily given δ, a larger  gives a clearer distin-
guishability of neighboring datasets and hence a higher risk of
privacy violation. Now, we will formally define DP as follows.
Definition 1: ((, δ)-DP [32]): A randomized mechanismM :
X → R with domain X and range R satisfies (, δ)-DP, if for
all measurable sets S ⊆ R and for any two adjacent datasets
D,D′ ∈ X ,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ. (1)
In this paper, we choose the Gaussian mechanism that
adopts L2 norm sensitivity, and this sensitivity of the function
s can be expressed as
∆s = max ‖s(D)− s(D′)‖2. (2)
It adds zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ2I in each
coordinate of the output s(D) as
M(D) = s(D) +N (0, σ2I), (3)
where I is an identity matrix and has the same size with s(D).
It satisfies (, δ)-DP when we properly select the value of σ.
B. Federated Learning
Let us consider a general FL system consisting of a honest-
but-curious server and U clients. Let Di denote the local
datasets held by client Ci, where U = {1, 2, . . . , U} and i ∈ U .
At the server, the goal is to learn a model over data that
resides at the U associated clients. Formally, this FL task can
be expressed as
w∗ = arg min
w
F (w), (4)
where F (w) =
∑
i∈U piFi(w), Fi(·) is the local loss function
of the i-th client, pi = |Di|/|D| ≥ 0 with
∑
i∈U pi = 1
and |D| = ∑i∈U |Di| is the total size of all data samples.
Generally, the local loss function Fi(·) is given by local
empirical risks and has the same expression for different
clients. At the server, a model aggregation is performed over
the K chosen clients. In more detail, w is the global model
parameter, given by
w =
∑
i∈K
piwi, (5)
where wi is the parameter vector trained at the i-th client,
K is a subset of U , with K chosen clients out of U clients
chosen for participating in the model aggregations.
Figure 1. A FL training model with an honest-but-curious server or an
eavesdropper who can infer the private features and reconstruct the raw data
by analyzing trained parameters from clients.
IV. PRIVACY AND CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first introduce a client-level differen-
tial privacy (CDP) algorithm in FL against curious servers.
Then, we develop an improved method for analyzing the loss
moment under moments accountant method [20]. We also
show how to select the standard deviation (STD) of additive
noises in CDP under a certain (, δ)-DP guarantee. Finally,
we analyze the convergence bound of the CDP in FL, which
reveals an explicit tradeoff between the privacy level and
convergence performance.
A. Client-level DP
In this subsection, we will introduce a CDP algorithm,
which can prevent information leakage from uploaded param-
eters, as depicted in Fig. 1. Algorithm 1 outlines our CDP al-
gorithm for training an effective model with the DP guarantee.
We denote by T the number of communication rounds, by w0
the initial global parameter, by σ the STD of additive noises
and by q the random sampling ratio (K = |K| = qU ). At the
beginning of this algorithm, the server broadcasts the initiate
global parameter w0 to clients. In the t-th aggregation, K
active clients respectively train the parameters by using local
databases with preset terminal conditions. After completing
the local training and clipping of wt+1i with threshold C, the
i-th client, ∀i ∈ K, will add noises to the trained parameters
wt+1i , and upload the noised parameters w˜
t+1
i to the server
for aggregation. Note that the noised parameters w˜t+1i is
calculated as w˜ti = w
t
i +N (0, σ2I), where σ2 is the variance
of artificial noises and this value is calculated by the clients
according to the privacy level (, δ), sampling ratio q and the
number of communication rounds T .
Then the server updates the global parameters wt+1 by
aggregating the local parameters integrated with different
weights according to (5) and broadcast them to the clients.
Based on the received global parameterswt+1, each client will
estimate the accuracy using local testing databases and start
the next round of training process based on these received
parameters. The FL completes when the aggregation time
reaches a preset number of communication T rounds and the
algorithm returns wT . Owing to the local perturbations, it will
be difficult for the curious server to infer private information of
the i-client. In this case, in order to protect the clients’ privacy
with (, δ)-DP, the STD of additive noises will be analyzed in
the following sections.
Algorithm 1: Client-level DP (CDP)
Data: T , w0, C, q,  and δ
1 Initialize: t = 0
2 Broadcast: w0, T and (, δ) to all clients
3 while t < T do
4 while i ∈ K do
5 Update the local parameters wt+1i as
6 wt+1i = arg minwi
Fi(wi,w
t
i);
7 Clip the local parameters
wt+1i = w
t+1
i /max
(
1,
‖wt+1i ‖
C
)
;
8 Calculate σ and upload noised parameters
w˜ti = w
t
i +N (0, σ2I);
9 Update the global parameters wt+1 as
10 wt+1 =
∑
i∈K
piw˜
t+1
i ;
11 The server broadcasts global parameters
12 while Ci ∈ {C1, C2, . . . , CU} do
13 Test the aggregating parameters wt+1;
14 using local dataset
15 t = t+ 1;
Result: wT
B. Bound of the Moment
According to [20], using Gaussian mechanism, we can
define privacy loss by
c , exp
(
αT (λ)
)
= exp
(
T∑
t=1
α(λ)
)
, (6)
and moment generating function by
α(λ) , ln(max{Dν1,ν0 , Dν0,ν1}), (7)
where λ is any positive integer, ν0 denotes the probability
density function (PDF) of N (0, σ2), ν1 denotes the mixture
of two Gaussian distributions qN (∆s, σ2) + (1− q)N (0, σ2),
q = K/U is the random sampling ratio,
Dν1,ν0 = Ez∼ν1
(
ν1
ν0
)λ
= Ez∼ν0
(
ν1
ν0
)λ+1
, (8)
and
Dν0,ν1 = Ez∼ν0
(
ν0
ν1
)λ
= Ez∼ν0
(
ν1
ν0
)−λ
. (9)
However, the derivations in [20] for the bound of moments
can only be applied for the rigorous constraint q ≤ 116σ . To
tackle this problem, we propose Lemma 1 to further bound
the moment.
Lemma 1: Considering two Gaussian distributions ν0 and
ν1 used in the moments accountant method, they satisfy the
following relationship:
Dν1,ν0 ≥ Dν0,ν1 . (10)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that the only difference between the Dν1,ν0 and Dν0,ν1
is the factor of λ+1 and −λ on the exponent. With Lemma 1,
we can obtain that α(λ) = Dν1,ν0 .
C. Sensitivity and Privacy Analysis
According to the definition of DP, we consider two adjacent
databases Di,D′i ∈ X in the i-th user, where Di and D′i have
the same size, and only differ by one sample.
Assumption 1: Assume that the batch size in the local train-
ing is equal to the number of training samples.
Consequently, for the i-th client with the training dataset Di,
the local training process can be written into the following
form:
wti(Di) = arg min
w
Fi(Di,w) = `(Di), (11)
where `(·) denotes the local training process. Therefore, the
sensitivity of the local training process can be given as
∆` = max
Di,D′i∈X
‖wti(Di)−wti(D′i)‖. (12)
Based on Assumption 1, we consider the general GD method
and have
wti(Di) = wt−1i − λ
∂Fi(Di,wt−1i )
wt−1i
= wt−1i −
λ
|Di|
|Di|∑
m=1
∂Fi(Di,m,wt−1i )
wt−1i
=
1
|Di|
|Di|∑
m=1
wti(Di,m).
(13)
Note that we can obtain the sensitivity as
∆` =
2C
|Di| , (14)
where C is the clipping threshold to bound ‖wi‖.
From (14), we can observe that when the size of training
datasets |Di| is large, the sensitivity of the aggregation process
should be comparable small. The intuition is that the maximum
difference one single data sample can make is 2C and such
a maximum difference is scaled down by a factor of |Di|
in a local training process since every data sample in Di
contributes equally to the resulting local model. For example,
if a model was trained on the records of patients with a certain
disease, acquiring that an individual’s record was among them
directly affects his or her privacy. If we increase the size of
training datasets, it will be more difficult to determine whether
this record was used as part of the model’s training datasets
or not.
With this sensitivity, we can design the Gaussian mechanism
N (0, σ) with (, δ)-DP requirement in terms of the sampling
ratio q = K/U and the number of communication rounds T .
The STD of the Gaussian noises can be derived according to
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Given the sampling ratio q and the number of
communication rounds T , to guarantee (, δ)-DP with respect
to all the data used in the training datasets, the STD of noises
σ from Gaussian mechanism should satisfy
σ =
∆`
√
2qT ln(1/δ)

. (15)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 quantifies the relation between the noise level σ
and the privacy level . It shows that for a fixed perturbation σ
on gradient, a larger q leads to a weaker privacy guarantee (i.e.,
a larger
√
q/). This is indeed true since when more clients
are involved in computing w at each communication round,
more aggregation times for each client. Also, for a given σ, a
larger T in the total training process lead to a higher chance
of information leakage because the observer may obtain more
information for training datasets. Furthermore, for a given
privacy protection level  and T , a larger value of q leads
to a larger value of σ, which helps reduce clients’ concerns
on participating in FL because clients are allowed to add more
noise to the trained local models. This requires us to choose
the parameters carefully in order to have a reasonable privacy
level.
D. Convergence for Private Federated Learning
In this subsection, we analyze the convergence of the CDP
algorithm in FL.
Assumption 2: We make the following assumptions on the
global loss function F (·) defined by F (·) , ∑Ui=1 piFi(·),
and the i-th local loss function Fi(·) for the analysis:
1) Fi(w) is convex;
2) F (w0)− F (w∗) = Ξ;
3) Fi(w) satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition with
the positive parameter µ, which implies that F (w) −
F (w∗) ≤ 12µ‖∇F (w)‖2, where w∗ is the optimal
result;
4) Fi(w) is L-Lipschitz smooth, i.e., for any w, w′,
‖∇Fi(w) − ∇Fi(w′)‖ ≤ L‖w − w′‖, where L is a
constant determined by the practical loss function;
5) η ≤ 1L , where η is the learning rate;
6) For any i and w, ‖∇Fi(w)−∇F (w)‖ ≤ εi, where εi
is the divergence metric.
Based on the above assumptions and Theorem 1, we can
obtain the follow result which characterizes the convergence
performance of the CDP algorithm.
Theorem 2: To guarantee (, δ)-DP, the convergence upper
bound of the CDP algorithm after T communication rounds
is given by
F (wT )− F (w∗) ≤ ATΞ
+ (1−AT )
(
κ0TK
U22
+
κ1(U −K)
K(U − 1)
)
, (16)
where A = 1−2µη+µη2L, κ0 = L
2∆`2 ln( 1δ )
µ and κ1 =
η2L2ε
2µ .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 2 shows an explicit tradeoff between convergence
performance and privacy: When privacy guarantee is weak
(large values of  and δ), the convergence bound will be
small, which indicates a tight convergence to the optimal
weights. From our assumptions, we know that ηL ≤ 1 and
obtain A < 1. Then, we show the process on discovering
the relationship between the convergence upper bound and the
number of total clients U , the number of participant clients K
and the number of communication rounds T .
Remark 1: The upper bound of loss function is as a convex
function of T for a given  and a sufficiently large U . In
more detail, a larger T has a negative impact on the model
quality by increasing the amount of noise added in each
communication round for a given privacy level  (in line with
(15)), but it also has a positive impact on the convergence
because it reduces the loss function value with more iterations.
With a slight abuse of notation, we consider continuous
values of U ≥ 1, 1 ≤ K ≤ U and T ≥ 1. Let h(U,K, T )
denote the RHS of (16) and we have
∂2h(U,K, T, )
∂T 2
= AT ln2A
(
Ξ− κ0TK
U22
−κ1(U −K)
K(N − 1) −
κ0TK
U2 lnA
)
. (17)
It can be seen that the first term and fourth term of on the
RHS of (17) are always positive. When U , K and  are set to
be large enough, we can see that the second term of on the
RHS of (17) is small. In this case, we have ∂
2h(U,T,)
∂T 2 > 0
and the upper bound is convex for T .
Then we consider the condition K = U , we have
∂2h(U, T, )
∂T 2
= AT ln2A
(
Ξ− κ0T
U2
− κ0T
U2 lnA
)
. (18)
If U and  are set to be large enough, we have ∂
2h(U,T,)
∂T 2 > 0
and the upper bound is convex for T .
According to our analysis above, there exists an optimal
value of T for a given privacy level . However, this optimal
value cannot be derived directly from (16), since some pa-
rameters, e.g., L, µ and Ξ, are difficult to obtain accurately.
One possible method for obtaining the optimal T is through
exhaustive search, i.e., try different value of T and choose
the one with the highest convergence performance. How-
ever, exhaustive search is time-consuming and computationally
complex. In the next section, we will propose an efficient
algorithm for finding a good value of T to achieve a high
convergence performance.
V. DISCOUNTING METHOD IN CDP
In this section, we first propose a discounting method to
improve convergence performance in the training process.
Then, we provide a noise recalculation method for obtaining
the noise STD in the case of varying T during the FL training.
Finally, we will summarize our proposed CRD algorithm.
A. Proposed Discounting Method
Based on the analysis above, we note that we can obtain
a smaller STD which will improve the training performance
if we reduce the value of T slightly when the training
performance stops improving. Therefore, we design a CRD
algorithm by adjusting the number of communication rounds
T with a discounting method during the training process to
achieve a high convergence performance. The training process
of such a CRD algorithm in CDP contains following steps:
• Step 1: Initializing: The server broadcasts the initial pa-
rameters w0, T ,  and δ;
• Step 2: Local training: All active clients locally compute
training parameters with local datasets and the
global parameter;
• Step 3: Norm clipping: In order to prove the DP guarantee,
the influence of each individual example on local
parameters should be bounded with a clipping
threshold C. Each parameter vector will be clipped
in L2 norm, i.e., the i-th local parameter vector
wti at the t-th communication round is replaced by
wti/max(1, ‖w
t
i
C ‖). We can remark that parameter
clipping of this form is a popular ingredient of SGD
and ML for non-privacy reasons;
• Step 4: Noise adding: Artificial Gaussian noises with a
certain STD will be added to the local trained
parameters to guarantee (, δ)-DP;
• Step 5: Parameter uploading: All active clients upload the
noised parameters to the server for aggregation;
• Step 6: Model aggregation: The server performs aggrega-
tion over the uploaded parameters from clients;
• Step 7: Model broadcasting: The server broadcasts the
aggregated parameters and the number of commu-
nication rounds T to all clients;
• Step 8: Model updating: All clients update their respective
models with the aggregated parameters, then test
the performance of the updated models and upload
the performance to the server;
• Step 9: Communication rounds discounting: When the
convergence performance stops improving, the dis-
counting method will be triggered in the server. The
server will obtain a smaller T than the previous
one with a linear discounting factor β2. This factor
can control the decaying speed of T . The FL
process will be completed when the aggregation
time reaches a preset T .
In this method, the value of T is determined iteratively to
ensure a high convergence performance in FL training. Obvi-
ously, when the value of T is adjusted, we must recalculate
a new STD of additive noises in terms of previous training
process. The diagrammatic expression of this method is shown
in Fig. 2. Therefore, we will develop a noise recalculation
method to update the STD of additive noises and T alternately
in the following subsection.
Figure 2. The training process of our proposed CDP algorithm with the CRD
method at the t-th communication round.
Remark 2: In order to help clients calculate proper STDs
added to their local trained parameters, the number of com-
munication rounds T is broadcasted from the server to all
clients as well as the aggregated parameters.
B. Noise Recalculation for Varying T
Now, let t be the index of the current communication round
and στ (0 ≤ τ ≤ t − 1) is the STD of additive noises at the
τ -th communication round. In our CRD algorithm, with a new
T , if t is greater than T , the training will stop. If t is less than
T , we need to recalculate the STD of noises and add them on
the local parameters in the following communication round.
Considering this, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3: After t (0 ≤ t < T ) communication rounds and
a new T , the STD of additive noises can be given as
σt =
 T − t
2
2q∆`2 ln( 1δ )
−∑t−1τ=0 1(στ )2
 12 . (19)
Proof: See Appendix D.
In Theorem 3, we can obtain a proper STD of the additive
noises based on the previous training process and the value of
T . From this result, we can find that if we have large STDs
(strong privacy guarantee) in the previous training process, i.e.,
στ is large, the recalculated STD will be small (weak privacy
guarantee), i.e., σt is small.
We also can note that if the value of T is not changed
in this communication round, the value of STD will remain
unchanged. Considering σt, σt+1 and unchanged T , from
equation (19), we can obtain
σt+1 =
 T − t− 1
2
2q∆`2 ln( 1δ )
−∑tτ=0 1(στ )2
 12 , (20)
and
2
2q∆`2 ln
(
1
δ
) − t−1∑
τ=0
1
(στ )2
=
T − t
(σt)
2 . (21)
Substituting equation (21) into equation (20), we have σt+1 =
σt, which is in line with our analysis. In this case, we sum-
marize the detailed steps of the CRD method in Algorithm 2.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of our analytical
results for different learning tasks. Then, we evaluate our
proposed CRD method, and demonstrate the effectiveness of
various parameter settings, such as the privacy level, the initial
value of T and discounting factor.
A. Evaluation of Numerical Results
In this subsection, we first describe our numerical validation
of the bound in (39) with σ = 0.01 by varying λ from 1 to 100
with a step size of 5. In Fig. 3 (a), we set q = 0.9, |Di| = 128,
∀i, and U = 50. In our validation, our bound is close but
always higher than the real divergence. We also did tests for
cases such as a smaller sampling ratio q = 0.1, a smaller
size of local datasets |Di| = 64, ∀i, and a larger number
of clients U = 200 in Fig. 3 (b), (c) and (d), respectively.
We found that the empirical bound always holds and close
under the given conditions, especially for a large enough |Di|.
Therefore, we have the conjecture that our bound is a valid
for the analytical moments accountant of sampled Gaussian
mechanism and seek its formal proof in our future work.
B. FL Models and Datasets
We evaluate the training of two different machine learning
models on different datasets, which represent a large variety of
both small and large models and datasets. The models include
Algorithm 2: Communication Rounds Discounting
Input: The value of an initial T ,
privacy parameters  and δ, clipping threshold C and
discounting factor β (β < 1).
Output: wT
1 Initialize: t = 0
2 Broadcast: w0, T and (, δ) to all clients
3 while t < T do
4 Recalculate the STD of additive noises:
5 σt = (T − t) 12 /
(
2
2q∆s2 ln( 1δ )
−∑t−1τ=0 1(στ )2) 12 ;
6 Locally train:
7 ∀i ∈ K, wt+1i = arg minw Fi(w,w
t
i);
8 Clip parameters:
9 wt+1i = w
t+1
i /max(1,
‖wt+1i ‖
C );
10 Add noise:
11 w˜t+1i = w
t
i +N (0, σtI);
12 Aggregate parameters:
13 wt+1 =
∑
i∈K
piw˜
t+1
i ;
14 if F (w)t+1 ≥ F (wt) then
15 Update the preset value of T as
T = β2(T − t) + t;
16 t = t+ 1;
17 return wT
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Figure 3. The comparison of our bound and real value of divergence in (39).
(a) q = 0.9, |Di| = 128, U = 50. (b) q = 0.1, |Di| = 128, U = 50. (c)
q = 0.9, |Di| = 64, U = 50. (d) q = 0.9, |Di| = 128, U = 200.
support vector machine (SVM) and multi-layer perceptron
(MLP).
1) SVM is trained on the IPUMS-US dataset, which are
census data extracted from [22] and contain 40000 individual
records with 58 attributes including age, education level and
so on. The categorical attributes in this dataset are denoted by
various integers. The label of each sample describes whether
the annual income of this individual is over 25k. In this model,
the loss function of SVM is given by
F (w) =
λ
2
‖w‖22 + max{ym −w>Di,m, 0}, (22)
where λ > 0 is a regularization coefficient, Di,m is the m-
th sample in Di, Di is the dataset of i-th client and ym ∈
{+1,−1} for m ∈ {1, . . . , |Di|}.
2) MLP network with a single hidden layer containing 32
hidden units, where ReLU units and softmax of 10 classes
(corresponding to the 10 digits) are applied. We use the cross-
entropy loss function, which can capture the error of the model
on the training data. We conduct experiments on the standard
MNIST dataset for handwritten digit recognition consisting
of 60000 training examples and 10000 testing examples [33].
Each example is a 28×28 size gray-level image of handwritten
digits from 0 to 10. In Fig. 4, we show several samples of the
standard MNIST dataset with a visual illustration.
Among them, the loss function for SVM is convex and
satisfies the first assumption in Assumption 2, whereas the
loss function for MLP and thus does not satisfy this condition.
The value of µ, L and εi are determined by the specific
loss function, and we can use estimated values in our ex-
periments [9]. The experimental results in this setting show
that our theoretical results and proposed algorithm also work
well for models (such as MLP) whose loss functions do not
satisfy Assumption 2.
Figure 4. Visual illustration of the standard MNIST dataset.
C. Evaluation of Theoretical Results
In this subsection, we verify our theoretical results with
SVM and MLP models. In Fig. 5 and 6, we show experimental
results of training loss as a function of T with various
privacy levels under CDP algorithm in FL using SVM and
MLP models, respectively. The number of clients, the size of
local samples and the privacy parameter are set as U = 50,
|Di| = 128 and δ = 0.01, respectively. This observation is
in line with Remark 1, and the reason comes from the fact
that a lower privacy level decreases the standard deviation of
additive noises and the server can obtain better quality ML
model parameters from the clients. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 also imply
that an optimal value of T increases almost with respect to the
increasing .
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the expectation of the training loss of
CDP algorithm in FL using MLP models, by varying privacy
level  and the value of T . From Fig. 7, the first scenario shows
that there is no sampling, a large T and a small  may lead
to the terrible performance. As shown in the second scenario
with sampling ratio q = 0.6 in Fig. 7, it also can retain the
same property.
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Figure 5. Value of the loss function under various T using the CDP algorithm
(SVM). (a) U = 50,K = 50 (q = 1). (b) U = 50,K = 30 (q = 0.6).
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Figure 6. Value of the loss function under various T using the CDP algorithm
(MLP). (a) U = 50,K = 50 (q = 1). (b) U = 50,K = 30 (q = 0.6).
D. Evaluation of the Proposed CRD Algorithm
In this subsection, to evaluate our CRD algorithm, we
apply the MLP model with the standard MNIST dataset.
Several experimental settings in our case study are introduced
as follows. The setting including the following main parts:
1) various initial values of T using discounting method;
2) various privacy levels using CRD algorithm; 3) various
discounting factors using CRD algorithm. We evaluate the
Figure 7. Value of the loss function under various T and privacy levels using
the CDP algorithm (MLP) with U = K = 50 (q = 1).
Figure 8. Value of the loss function under various T and privacy levels using
the CDP algorithm (MLP) with U = 50 and K = 30 (q = 0.6).
effectiveness of discounting method, and compare the results
with an uniform privacy budget allocation algorithm adopted
by Abadi et al. [20] in the CDP algorithm, named original
CDP. Furthermore, we also use the CDP algorithm with the
optimal T (obtained by searching) as a benchmark, named
optimal CDP.
Initial Value of T . In the previous experiments, the initial
value of T is set as the default. To examine the effect of
initial T , we vary its value from 150 to 300 and measure the
model convergence performance under several fixed privacy
levels. We also choose this handwritten digit recognition task
with the number of clients U = 50, the size of local samples
|Di| = 128, the discounting factor β = 0.7 and the DP
parameter δ = 0.01. Fig. 9 shows that when T is closer to
the optimal value of T (the optimal value of T by searching
is shown in the above subsection), we will obtain a better
convergence performance. If we can obtain the optimal value
of T at the beginning of the CDP algorithm, we will have the
best convergence performance. This observation is also in line
with Remark 1.
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Figure 9. Value of loss function using the CDP algorithm with CRD method
(β = 0.7) with various initial values of T .
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Figure 10. Value of the loss function using the original CDP, CDP with
CRD method (β = 0.9) and the optimal CDP. (a) U = 50,K = 50. (b)
U = 50,K = 30.
Privacy Level. We choose a handwritten digit recognition
task with the number of clients U = 50, the initial number
of communication rounds T = 200, the size of local samples
|Di| = 128 and the DP parameter δ = 0.01. We also set
two different sampling ratio q = 1 and q = 0.6, which
are corresponding to Fig. 10 (a) and (b), respectively. In
Fig. 10, we describe how value of the loss function change
with various values of the privacy level  under original CDP
(Algorithm 1), CDP with CRD (Algorithm 2) and optimal
CRD (obtain the optimal T by searching). Fig. 11 shows
the test accuracy corresponding to Fig. 10. We can note that
using Algorithm 2 with discounting factor β = 0.9 can greatly
improve the convergence performance in Fig. 10 (a) and (b),
which is close to the optimal results. In Fig. 12, we choose
the same parameters with Fig. 10 and show the change of T
during training in one experiment under the CDP algorithm
with CRD method (β = 0.9). In Fig. 12, we can note that a
smaller privacy level  will have an early end in CDP algorithm
with CRD method. The intuition is that a larger T can lead to
a higher chance of information leakage and a larger noise STD
of additive noises. Then, the CRD method may be triggered
and a decreased T will be broadcasted to chosen clients from
the server.
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Figure 11. Test accuracy using the original CDP, CDP with CRD method
(β = 0.9) and the optimal CDP. (a) U = 50,K = 50. (b) U = 50,K = 30.
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Figure 12. The number of communication rounds using CDP algorithm with
CRD method (β = 0.9). (a) U = 50,K = 50. (b) U = 50,K = 30.
Discounting Factor. In Fig. 13, we vary the value of
β from 0.7 to 0.95 and plot their convergence results of
the loss function. The number of clients, the size of local
samples, the initial number of communication rounds and the
DP parameter are set as U = 50, |Di| = 128, T = 200
and δ = 0.01, respectively. We observe that when the privacy
level is fixed, a larger β results in a slower decay speed of
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Figure 13. Value of loss function using the CDP algorithm with CRD method
with various discount factors.
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Figure 14. Communication rounds consuming using the CDP algorithm with
CRD method with various discount factors.
the T which means careful adjustments of T in the training
and benefits convergence performance. With various values
of β, when we choose β = 0.9, the CDP algorithm with
CRD method will have the best convergence performance.
However, this convergence performance is also worse than the
optimal CDP, which is consistent with Remark 1. In Fig. 14,
we show the communication rounds consuming (the number
of required communication rounds) with various discounting
factors using the same parameters with Fig. 13. We find that
more careful adjustments (corresponding to a larger β) will
lead to more communication rounds consuming. In Fig. 14, we
can also note that the optimal CDP has the best convergence
performance but a large communication rounds consuming.
Hence, we can conclude that there is a tradeoff between com-
munication rounds consuming and convergence performance
by choosing β. As a future work, it is of great interest to
Dν1,ν0 −Dν0,ν1 =
∫ +∞
−∞
ν0
(
1− q + qe 2z∆`−∆`
2
2σ2
)λ+1
dz −
∫ +∞
−∞
ν0
(
1− q + qe 2z∆`−∆`
2
2σ2
)−λ
dz
z=y+ ∆s2=
∫ +∞
−∞
e
(y+ ∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe y∆`σ2
)λ+1
dz −
∫ +∞
−∞
e
(y+ ∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe y∆`σ2
)−λ
dz.
(23)
∫ 0
−∞
e
(y+ ∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe y∆`σ2
)λ+1
dz −
∫ 0
−∞
e
(y+ ∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1 + q
(
e
y∆`
σ2 − 1
))−λ
dz
y=−z
=
∫ +∞
0
e
(z−∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe−z∆`σ2
)λ+1
dz −
∫ +∞
0
e
(z−∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe−z∆`σ2
)−λ
dz.
(24)
analytically evaluate the optimum value of β for which the
loss function is minimized.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a CDP algorithm in
FL to preserve clients’ privacy and proved that the CDP
algorithm can satisfy the requirement of DP under a certain
privacy level by properly selecting the STD of additive noises.
Then, we have developed a convergence bound on the loss
function in the CDP algorithm. Our developed bound reveals
that there is an optimal value of communication rounds (T )
in terms of convergence performance for a given protection
level, which inspires us to design an intelligent scheme for
adaptively choosing the value of T . To tackle this problem,
we have proposed a CRD method for training FL model,
which will be triggered when the convergence performance
stops improving. Our experiments have demonstrated that this
discounting method in the CDP algorithm can obtain a better
tradeoff requirements on convergence performance and privacy
levels. We can also note that various initial values of T and
discounting factors β bring out different convergence results.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Here, we want to compare the value between Dν1,ν0 and
Dν0,ν1 . Hence, we conduct the property of Dν1,ν0 − Dν0,ν1
and rewrite it as inequation (23). Transforming the negative
part of this integral, we have inequation (24). Hence, we can
obtain that
Dν1,ν0 −Dν0,ν1 =
∫ +∞
0
(φpositive(z)− φnegative(z)) dz,
(25)
where
φpositive(z) = e
−(z+ ∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe z∆`σ2
)λ+1
+ e
−(z−∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe−z∆`σ2
)λ+1
(26)
and
φnegative(z) = e
−(z+ ∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe z∆`σ2
)−λ
+ e
−(z−∆`2 )
2
2σ2
(
1− q + qe−z∆`σ2
)−λ
. (27)
Then, let us use ϕ(z) as
ϕ(z) , φpositive(z)
φnegative(z)
. (28)
In order to develop the monotonicity of ϕ(z), we define θ =
e
z∆`
σ2 , and then have equation (29). Then, we define γ , (λ+
1)q
(
θ − 1θ
)
/(1− q + qθ) and we consider the condition that
γ < 1, we know
γ(1− q + qθ)
(λ+ 1)
= 1− q + qθ −
(
1− q + q
θ
)
. (30)
Therefore, we can obtain
1− q + qθ
1− q + qθ = 1−
γ
λ+ 1
. (31)
And then, we can rewrite dϕ(z)dz as equation (32) on the top
of the next page. We define
ψ(γ) =
(
γ + 1 +
(
λγ
λ+ 1
+ 1
)(
1− γ
λ+ 1
)2λ+1)
. (33)
Then,
dψ(γ)
dγ
= 1−
(
1 +
2λγ
λ+ 1
)(
1− γ
λ+ 1
)2λ
, (34)
and
d2ψ(γ)
dγ2
=
2λ(2λ+ 1)γ
(λ+ 1)2
(
1− γ
λ+ 1
)2λ−1
≥ 0. (35)
Because dψ(γ)dγ |γ=0 = 0, we know d
2ψ(γ)
dγ2 ≥ 0. Considering
ϕ(0) = 1, we can conclude that ϕ(z) ≥ 1 and Dν1,ν0 ≥
Dν0,ν1 . This completes the proof. 
dϕ(z)
dz
=
dϕ(θ)
dθ
dθ(z)
dz
=
dθ(z)
dz
1− q
φ2negative(z)
(1− q + qθ)λ
(
1− q + q
θ
)−λ−1(
(λ+ 1)q
(
θ − 1
θ
)
− (1− q + qθ)
)
+
dθ(z)
dz
1− q
φ2negative(z)
(
1− q + q
θ
)λ
(1− q + qθ)−λ−1
(
λq
(
θ − 1
θ
)
+ (1− q + qθ)
)
.
(29)
dϕ(z)
dz
=
dθ(z)
dz
1− q
φ2negative(z)
(1− q + qθ)λ+1
(
1− q + q
θ
)−λ−1(
γ + 1 +
(
λγ
λ+ 1
+ 1
)(
1− γ
λ+ 1
)2λ+1)
. (32)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this proof, we define µ0 , N (0, σ), µ1 , N (∆`, σ),
ν0 , N (0, σ) and ν0 , qµ0 + (1 − q)µ1. Then, we have
M(D) ∼ ν0 and M(D′) ∼ ν1. Hence, the λ-th moment
α(λn) can be expressed as
α(λ) = ln max {Dν0,ν1 , Dν1,ν0} , (36)
where
Dν1,ν0 = Ez∼ν1
(
ν1
ν0
)λ
andDν0,ν1 = Ez∼ν0
(
ν0
ν1
)λ
. (37)
Here, we want to bound Dν0,ν1 and Dν1,ν0 .
Based on Lemma 1, let us consider Dν1,ν0 , we have
Dν1,ν0 = Ez∼ν1
(
ν1
ν0
)λ
=
∫ +∞
−∞
ν0
(
1− q + qe 2z∆s−∆`
2
2σ2
)λ+1
dz
=
∫ +∞
−∞
ν0
λ+1∑
l=0
(
λ+ 1
l
)
(1− q)λ+1−lqle
l(2z∆`−∆`2)
2σ2 dz
=
λ+1∑
l=0
(
λ+ 1
l
)
(1− q)λ+1−lqle l(l−1)∆`
2
2σ2
≤
(
1− q + qeλ∆s
2
2σ2
)λ+1
≤ e
q(λ+1)
(
e
λ∆`2
2σ2 −1
)
.
(38)
Assuming λ∆`
2
2σ2  1 for λ ∈ [1, T ], we have
Dν1,ν0 ≤ eq(λ+1)
(
λ∆`2
2σ2
+O
(
λ2∆`4
4σ4
))
≈ e qλ(λ+1)∆`
2
2σ2 . (39)
We use the above moments and have
αT (λ) ≤
T∑
t=1
α(λ, σ) =
Tqλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2σ2
. (40)
Using the tail bound by moments [20], we have
δ = min
λ
exp
(
αT (λ)− λ)
= min
λ
exp
(
Tqλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2σ2
− λ
)
. (41)
Considering inequation (41), we know
Tqλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2σ2
− λ = Tq∆`
2
2σ2
(
λ+
1
2
− σ
2
Tq∆`2
)2
− Tq∆s
2
2σ2
(
1
2
− σ
2
Tq∆`2
)2
. (42)
When setting λ = σ
2
Tq∆`2 − 12 , we have
δ ≥ exp
(
−Tq∆`
2
2σ2
(
1
2
− σ
2
T∆`2
)2)
. (43)
Therefore,
ln(δ) ≥ −Tq∆`
2
2σ2
(
1
2
− σ
2
Tq∆`2
)2
, (44)
and then we can obtain
ln
(
1
δ
)
≤ Tq∆`
2
2σ2
(
1
2
− σ
2
Tq∆`2
)2
=
Tq∆`2
8σ2
− 
2
+
2σ2
2Tq∆`2
. (45)
Since δ ∈ (0, 1), we can obtain
Tqλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2σ2
− λ < 0. (46)
Combine inequation (46), we can bound ln (1/δ) as
ln
(
1
δ
)
< − 
4
+
2σ2
2Tq∆`2
<
2σ2
2Tq∆`2
. (47)
Therefore, we can choose σ satisfies
σ =
∆`
√
2qT ln
(
1
δ
)

. (48)
to guarantee (, δ)-DP in the FL framework. This completes
the proof. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we define
wt+1 ,
∑
i∈K
piw˜
t+1
i =
∑
i∈K
pi(w
t+1
i + n
t+1
i ), (49)
F (wt+1)− F (wt) ≤
(
nt+1 − η
∑
i∈K
pi∇Fi(wt)
)>
∇F (wt) + L
2
‖
∑
i∈K
pi(n
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i − η∇Fi(wt))‖2
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η2L
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2
‖
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t+1
i ‖2.
(53)
and
nt+1 ,
∑
i∈K
pin
t+1
i . (50)
Using the second-order Taylor expansion, we have
F (wt+1)− F (wt) ≤ (wt+1 −wt)>∇F (wt)
+
L
2
‖wt+1 −wt‖2. (51)
Because
wt+1i = w
t − η∇Fi(wt). (52)
Then, substitute inequation (52) and inequation (49) into in-
equation (51), we have inequation (53). The expected objective
function F (wt+1) can be expressed as
E{F (wt+1)} ≤ F (wt)− η‖∇F (wt)‖2
+
η2L
2
E{‖
∑
i∈K
pi∇Fi(wt)‖2}+ L
2
E{‖nt+1‖2}. (54)
With an assumption that pi = 1/K and we have
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According to Assumption 2, we know
E{εi} = 1
U
∑
i∈U
εi =
1
U
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i∈U
‖∇Fi(wt)−∇F (wt)‖2
=
1
U
∑
i∈U
‖∇Fi(wt)‖2 − ‖∇F (wt)‖2, (56)
Subtracting E{εi} into inequation (55), we have inequa-
tion (57). Then, subtracting inequation (57) into inequa-
tion (54), we have
E{F (wt+1)} ≤ F (wt)− η
(
ηL
2
− 1
)
‖∇F (wt)‖2
+
L
2
E{‖nt+1‖2}+ (U −K)ε
K(U − 1) ≤ +η
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ηL
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+ F (wt) +
L
2
E{‖nt+1‖2}+ η
2L(U −K)ε
2K(U − 1) . (58)
Subtracting F (w∗) into both sides of inequation (58), we have
inequation (59). Considering Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition
and applying inequation (59) recursively, and then considering
the independence of additive noises, we know
F (wt)− F (w∗) ≤ (1− 2µη + µη2L)t (F (w0)− F (w∗))
+
L2(1− (1− 2µη + µη2L)t)
2µ
(
E{‖n‖2}
+
η2(U −K)ε
K(U − 1)
)
. (60)
Substituting inequation (48) into the above inequality, we have
F (wt)− F (w∗) ≤ (1− 2µη + µη2L)t (F (w0)− F (w∗))
+
L(1− (1− 2µη + µη2L)t)
µ
(
L∆`2qt ln(1/δ)
U2
+
η2L(U −K)ε
2K(U − 1)
)
. (61)
Hence, the convergence bound can be given as
F (wt)− F (w∗) ≤ AtΞ
+ (1−At)
(
κ0tK
U22
+
κ1U(U −K)
K(U − 1)
)
, (62)
where A = 1−2µη+µη2L, κ0 = L
2∆`2 ln( 1δ )
µ and κ1 =
η2L2ε
2µ .
This completes the proof. 
E{‖
∑
i∈K
pKi ∇Fi(wt)‖2} =
U −K
UK(U − 1)
∑
i∈N
‖∇Fi(wt)−∇F (wt)‖2 + ‖∇F (wt)‖2 ≤ (U −K)ε
K(U − 1) + ‖∇F (w
t)‖2. (57)
E{F (wt+1)} − F (w∗) ≤ E{F (wt)} − F (w∗) + η
2L(U −K)ε
2K(U − 1) + η
(
ηL
2
− 1
)
‖∇F (wt)‖2 + L
2
E{‖nt+1‖2}. (59)
ln
(
1
δ
)
≤ q∆`
2
8
(
t∑
τ=1
1
(στ )2
+
T − t
σ2
)
− 
2
+
2
2q∆`2
(∑t
τ=1
1
(στ )2 +
T−t
σ2
) < 2
2q∆`2
(∑t
τ=1
1
(στ )2 +
T−t
σ2
) . (66)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Using the above definition of moments (40) and a preset
value of T , we have
αT (λ) ≤
T∑
τ=1
α(λ) =
t∑
τ=1
qλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2(στ )2
+
T−t∑
τ=1
qλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2σ2
=
t∑
τ=1
qλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2(στ )2
+
(T − t)qλ(λ+ 1)∆`2
2σ2
. (63)
Using the tail bound by moments [20], we have
δ = min
λ
exp
(
αT (λ)− λ) . (64)
Because of
min{αT (λ)− λ} = −q∆`
2
8
(
t∑
τ=1
1
(στ )2
+
T − t
σ2
)
+

2
− 
2
2q∆`2
(∑t
τ=1
1
(στ )2 +
T−t
σ2
) , (65)
where λ = − 12 + σ
2
q∆`2
(∑t
τ=1
σ2
(στ )2
+T−t
) . Therefore, we
have (66). Then, we can set
σ =
 T − t
2
2q∆`2 ln( 1δ )
−∑tτ=1 1(στ )2
 12 (67)
to guarantee (, δ)-DP for the following training. This com-
pletes the proof. 
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